Reproduct Defensive strategy by the target type email attack using the theory of games

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Abstract

This paper discusses real time and dynamic decision making process on cyber attacks, under the game theoretical assumption that an attacker will act to maximize illegal gain while a defender dose to minimize loss due to the attack. The paper develops a decision making model corresponding to the process, where the gain and loss are assessed alternately by the attacker and defender, and attack and defense plans are sequentially determined.

本文では,ゲーム理論をモデル化し,サイバー攻撃における攻撃者と防御者の戦略を,動的に意思決定する手法を検討した.攻撃者は最大の利得が得られる攻撃策を選択し,防御者は攻撃に対して,最小の損失で防御できる防御策を選択する意思徹底モデルを提案する.